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Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is a full service repair and maintenance facility, 
similar to many others throughout the Navy.  Its mission is to provide rigorous phased 
maintenance and repair work at specified intervals, primarily on U.S. submarines.  
Shipyard work could be described as high tempo, well-orchestrated chaos.  Large cranes 
shift heavy loads adjacent to the gauge calibration shop.  Power cables from yet another 
shop run conspicuously through the middle of these two.  Forklifts seem to be in constant 
motion along with the hydraulic lifts used to facilitate hull cleaning of the submarines in 
dry dock. 
Maintenance intervals are normally determined by OPNAV (the office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations) and funding is passed incrementally throughout a fiscal year 
to offset the incurred costs of each ship or submarine.  However, the shipyard has 
recently received a change order from OPNAV designating them as a “mission funded” 
command.  This means that they receive an annual budget like other commands.  It is 
now the command’s responsibility to manage its budget appropriately throughout the 
year and balance costs amongst all ship and submarine availabilities and the cost of 
running the shipyard. 
The Material Department (Code 200) is the primary office within the command to 
execute logistics policy.  Hundreds of civilian shipyard workers constitute the majority of 
the labor force, performing all of the actual repairs and associated labor (forklift and 
crane operation, etc).  The amount of work done day to day is the result of a carefully 
planned out scheduling process that begins many months earlier. Other tasks pertinent to 
this study are performed throughout the organization including:  
• Pre-planning of work to be done on each unit, 
• Budgeting for each unit’s availability, 
• Identifying material per individual work package, 
• Ordering and tracking material, 
• Receipt and storage of received material, 
• Turnover of material to shipyard labor pool, 
• Expediting material, 
• Monitoring and reporting progress of repairs, 
• Identifying churn and excess, and  
  2
• Managing excess material for future disposition. 
   
The length of a repair stay depends on the type of availability for which a ship or 
submarine is scheduled.  Ship Repair Availabilities (SRA) are characterized as high 
intensity, fast paced repairs of short duration, typically not more than 90 days.  At the 
other end of the spectrum, units scheduled for the more comprehensive Engineering 
Repair Overhaul (ERO), could expect to be in the shipyard for 18 to 24 months.  In order 
to maximize the amount of work done and to optimize the sequencing of work, 
engineering planners develop a work package anywhere from 11 to 18 months prior to 
the commencement of work, which is referred to as A-0 in industry parlance.    
The volume of material requirements mandates that procurement commence well 
ahead of the scheduled work.   Adherence to the schedule is a top priority. Delays in 
schedule have the potential to disrupt the overall process.  Item “A” may be a key 
component in a critical path for items “B” and “C”.  Any work stoppage in “A” may 
cause cascading delays down the line.  In order to properly prepare for these critical 
requirements, certain parameters of material readiness are delineated.  If followed, these 
parameters ensure timely availability of material for any one requirement.  Parameters 
specify that material will be ordered well in advance.  Items with longer lead times are 
procured earlier in addition to items that are more complex, require complicated 
contracts, and hard to find items.  Many items may not be available or are out of 
production since the manufacturers are no longer in business.  In these situations, the 
material department would have to search for a manufacturer capable of producing such 
an item and contract for production.  However, the Navy Supply System fills most 
requisitions from existing inventories.  Current shipyard policy for the procurement of 













A-11  Material requirements from work package are ordered 
A-2   75% of all required material on hand or on order  
A-0  90% of all required material on hand, 100% on order 
(Where A-2 is 60 days prior to the availability and A-0 is the first day of scheduled work) 
(Percentages are NAVSEA requirements) 
 
Figure 1:  Material Requirement Timeline 
 
 
 Procurement of material in accordance with these metrics summarizes the core of 
the material department’s responsibilities.  Figure 1 depicts the basic timeline that is used 
for an availability and where churn generation begins (A-0). The material procurement 
cycle is where the bulk of the identified material requirements are ordered and filled. The 
first requirement that NAVSEA dictates occurs at A-2; here 75% of all required material 
for the availability is to be on hand (required material received by PHNSY personnel).   
Between A-2 and A-0 surplus time and churn cutoff fall. Expediting of material that is 
not expected to be received by the start of the availability needs to be done here. 
Expediting is where material procurement and receipt process are heightened. Delivery 
times need to be moved to ensure timely receipt of material. This is done by offering 
premiums to speed-up production and delivery times. Some contracts are even cancelled 
during expediting and new ones generated through different manufacturers to ensure 
timelines are met. At A-0 NAVSEA requires that 100% of all required material be on 
order and that 90% of required material be on hand.  
 
MATERIAL PROCUREMENT CYCLE SURPLUS TIME CHURN GENERATION CUTOFF
C H U R N
µ + 3 sigma
(34 days)
TIME A-11 (330 DAYS) A-2 (60 DAYS) A-0 `
MILESTONE COMMENCE PLANNIG PHASE 75% ON HAND 90% ON HAND/100% ON ORDER
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A.  THE PROBLEM 
 
Metrics provide a snapshot to evaluate performance.  When a specific metric 
raises a flag, an in-depth examination and analysis by management might follow.  The 
amount of input data and corresponding output relative to the scope of work in a shipyard 
is enormous.  A wide span of oversight is maintained over various activities. Recent 
examinations have indicated that performance on material churn and excess do not meet 
NAVSEA standards. The two metrics of concern in this study are churn rates and excess 
material. Churn represents the percentage of material required that is identified and 
ordered after the start of an availability (A-0).  Excess material consists of everything that 
was ordered for an availability, but not installed for some reason (unused material on 
hand 30 days after the close of an availability). NAVSEA’s tolerance for both items is 
5%1.  PHNSY has recently reported rates in excess of 15% for both churn and excess.  
Based upon field interviews, the two most likely reasons are growth work and requisition 
maintenance.  Growth work encompasses additions to previously identified repairs or 
maintenance that was not in the approved availability work package and additional parts 
required to complete jobs already scheduled. For example, a boat scheduled to have its 
refrigeration system overhauled discovers an additional broken valve that was not 
included for replacement as part of the overhaul. The subsequent material requirement 
would be considered “growth work.”  Requisition maintenance is the process whereby 
procurement clerks monitor the status of outstanding material.  If a discrepancy exists, 
such as material not on hand by the supplier’s published delivery date, then the clerks 
must expedite as necessary.  Given the volume of material required, failure to closely 
monitor the flow of material can have significant effects.  Supply clerks spend as much, if 
not more time performing requisition maintenance as they do actually submitting 
requisitions.  High rates of churn and excess material could induce work delays and drain 
financial resources, respectively. 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.navsea.navy.mil/specs&standards/ 
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B.  OBJECTIVE 
 
The objective of this project is to conduct an operational analysis and assessment 
of the material requirement process.  A recent policy requiring the use Local 
Management Indicator Codes (LMIC) on material ordered after A-0 has been instituted to 
assist in providing more detailed information on the causes of churn.  The goal of this 
research is to identify and provide recommendations for the causes of churn and excess 
material generated above the specified threshold. We answer the following questions.  
1. What are the causes of churn and excess?  










































A.  INITIAL ASESSMENT 
 
In determining the solution to the research question, several root causes were 
identified.   These root causes were identified through numerous field interviews, and 
examination of historical records and various command directives.  To test the validity of 
these root causes and answer the research question, statistical measures and field 
interviews were used along with evaluation of current practices against generally 
accepted principles of supply chain management and operations management.  The field 
interviews and data collection yielded considerable insight into possible causes of churn 
and excess.  However, due to time and manpower limitations, the study focused on what 
we considered the most significant contributors to the problems.  These six contributors 
are requisition lead-time, requisition maintenance, forecasting techniques, configuration 
management (equipment validation), accountability, and incentives 
 
B.  LEAD TIME 
 
Examination of material lead times was conducted to determine if they could be 
contributing to churn and excess due to work stoppage or delay.  Interviews with 
shipyard personnel suggested a perception that excessive supply system lead-time is the 
root cause of many problems.   The analysis of lead times compared material lead times 
to their relative frequency.  Since material orders are phased during the planning phase, if 
a significant portion of the lead-time distribution exceeds the time remaining in the 
planning phase, then the supply system could be inducing churn.  
The analysis examined the population of requisitions for the month of June 2003.  
Specifically, all requisitions generated by the shipyard in the month of June for every 
submarine in both the planning and execution phases were included. The analysis 
included submarines in all types of availabilities at different stages of the repair process. 
Requisition lead-time data included values from 0 to 48 days.  In the execution of the 
repair process, the shipyard uses material procured from outside sources as well as 
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material held locally (in stock at FISC or carried in its own shop stores).  Lead-time does 
not include material from these local sources.  It is for this reason that requisitions with 
customer wait times (lead time) of 3 days or less were excluded.  Due to its remote 
location, items received in 2 days or less can be said with reasonable certainty to 
originate from within.  Either scenario could properly represent items with resulting lead 
times of 3 days.  However, there was almost no statistical difference in the resulting 
characteristics and values when eliminating lead times of 3 or less as compared to 2 days 
or less.  It is for these reasons that the lead time review of June requisitions was limited to 
items having a lead time of 4 days or greater.  Sample size totaled 2,561 documents. The 
following summary statistics apply (measured in days) and are summarized in figure 2: 
Mean = 9.99 
Standard Deviation = 7.85 




















             Figure 2:  Distribution of Material Lead Time 
 
 Per the planning phase milestones for material procurement, this data suggests 
that excessive supply system lead-time is not a contributing factor.  Toward the end of the 
planning phase, the last material metric prior to A-0 requires 75% of all material to be on 
hand or at least on order no later than A-2 (60 days out).  As previously mentioned, the 
orders are staggered as best as possible to match their delivery sequence with the 
sequence of required work. Therefore, we conclude that at least 75% of the required 
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material will have a slack in lead-time of 26 days (60 day order point – 34 day lead time 
demonstrated above).  This does not address the 25% of material not yet required to be on 
hand.  However, the sequencing of material requirements precludes this from becoming a 
significant factor.  Since the final metric requires 100% on order at A-0, the shipyard can 
plan to have 99% of all material required not later than A+34 days. The final 25% of 
material requirements will not be required in the first 34 days of repairs.  However, it 
should be noted that failure to sequence requirements could adversely affect this trend.  
In the case of the 1% of requirements in excess of 34 days, lead-time required may not 
support the work schedule.  The only other constraint in this scenario would be the 
limitation of the material-ordering branch to submit and generate requisitions in support 
of the prescribed timeline.  They have indicated that no such limitation exists. 
 
C. REQUISITION MAINTENANCE 
 
Despite the analysis and findings within the previous section, many material 
expeditors find themselves ensuring required delivery dates are met.  In many instances, 
they are unable to have the required material on hand when needed.  Requisitions are 
submitted as required; however required delivery dates (RDD) either cannot be met or are 
contingent on other requisitions with regards to quantity or associated equipment.  This 
results in dual or triple path sourcing, where a second or sometimes third requisition is 
ordered without canceling the first requisition (hedging the bet on which will arrive first) 
or simply reordering after A-0.  The hypothesis is that untimely requisition maintenance 
is the primary cause of many last minute expediting efforts.  Requisition maintenance is 
the process whereby material is monitored after it has been ordered to ensure it is 
flowing as requested.  Throughout the planning phase, procurement personnel are 
supposed to process the material outstanding file repeatedly to ensure that the most 
current status indicates that the estimated delivery date (EDD) is no later that the RDD.  
In the instance when an unacceptable EDD or outdated status appears, procurement 
personnel are supposed to either expedite the material or cancel it and pursue another 
source.  Therefore, lead-time is also in large part a function of the efforts of material 
planners.  In other cases, lead times are reasonable but still insufficient to meet a 
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prescribed due date.  Reasons for excessive turn around time can include, but are not 
limited to, lack of current manufacturing, backorders and contract requirements.  
We reviewed detailed requisition maintenance procedures at PHNSY, including 
the action taken to review the most recent status, the methods of identifying bad status, 
and the prescribed periodicity of these actions.  In the review of shipyard instructions and 
various field interviews, PHNSY indicated that no policy exists for the continued review 
and update of outstanding requisitions.  Therefore, the identification of bad status (i.e. 
unacceptable EDD) could occur too late within the planning phase window as efforts to 
expedite or outsource requirement are delayed.  Untimely identification of this data could 




In the process of executing repairs and attempting to match material requirements 
with those repairs, forecasting is critical.  The methods used to gauge equipment wear out 
and failures are directly related to the efficiency of the material procurement process 
relative to the overhaul.  Furthermore, the degree to which forecasted amounts are 
monitored, reviewed, and updated will either maintain or inhibit the effectiveness of such 
techniques.   
Required material is classified in one of two categories: mandatory or contingent.  
Mandatory items represent material that, due to the nature of the overhaul, has been 
deemed necessary to be removed and replaced.  Inspection and evaluation of the item is 
not performed. The actual state of wear or failure of a particular item is not relevant.  
Analysis by NAVSEA will have determined if an item is classified as mandatory.  The 
classification results from historical trends, or as are often the case, a redundant safety 
requirement in accordance with the Submarine Safety program.  This latter case is well 
illustrated by a typical oil change on a car.  In addition to removing and replacing all 
engine oil, the filter itself is replaced.  In many instances, the filter may possess continued 
service life.  However, the relative costs of a new filter as well as the consequences of an 
old filter failing make it efficient and cost effective to change the filter.  Such is the case 
with mandatory material requirements.  Mandatory items are identified in the planning 
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phase and ordered accordingly.  Upon receipt and commencement of installation, all 
mandatory material is installed.  Examination of forecasting techniques did not consider 
mandatory items.  
Contingent material represents items that have not been deemed necessary for 
replacement in the repair/overhaul process.  This designation also results from previous 
historical trends and/or the relatively minor cost or importance of an item.  Contingent 
items are identified in the planning phase, but not always ordered.   It is these items that 
constitute the analysis of forecasting techniques. 
In analyzing the techniques developed for the forecasting of contingent material, 
SHAPEC (Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center) indicated that it uses a 
heuristic approach for determining material requirements. Contingent items were ordered 
only when the engineers deemed them necessary, in essence a judgment call relying on 
the experience of an engineer. These procedures were not applied by an operations 
analysis team and did not use mathematical models that considered dependent variables 
such as historical failure, expected service life, ease of acquisition, cost, lead time, etc.   
The model is based upon a historical 50% metric.  It states that if contingent material has 
been used in at least 50% of previous availabilities then it becomes a candidate for 
procurement.  The material is then ordered in the planning phase if the planner feels it is 
necessary.  Unlike mandatory material, this process requires the inspection of the old unit 
to determine whether or not replacement is required.  Only if the part has failed or 
exhibits the appropriate wear and tear for prudent replacement, is the contingent material 
installed.  Any instance in which material was not replaced would generate excess 
material.  Consequently, failure to order contingent material that was subsequently 
required would generate churn.  Therefore, the possible impact of inaccurate forecasting 
on both churn and excess material generation is significant.  Excess material from one 
availability is set aside for use in a subsequent repair if needed.  However, the shipyard 
has indicated that the process by which previously excess material is made available 




The process by which SHAPEC determines if an item meets this threshold again 
differs greatly from other conventional models.  A brief description of their current 
methods along with relevant dilemmas is presented. 
 
1. Historical reviews based on sample size of 1.   In determining whether the 
50% metric has been met, SHAPEC reviews the demand from the last 
overhaul.2  In some instances, the previous two boats are examined. This 
represents only a small sample size and could not represent the true metric in 
determining weather to order or not to order using the 50% metric. The 
SHAPEC representative reported and noted that the available data is limited 
(less than 100 overhauls). Many of which do not have reliable computerized 
data for analysis. 
 
2. Use of heuristics in forecasting process.  In further discussions with the 
SHAPEC engineering team, our team also noted the use of expert opinion as 
the basis for procurement of material in the planning phase.  Furthermore, 
there are no command published guidelines regarding the use of heuristics.  
The potential for different estimates among different personnel is large. 
 
3. Supplemental directive that hinders the process.  In an effort to combat recent 
levels of excess, a recent standing order has been announced stating that all 
contingent material that has been ordered will be installed.3  Per PHNSY, the 
rationale for this was twofold: First, it would alleviate material left over at the 
end of the availability.  Secondly, this would better maintain the affected 
system in the long run.  Since the component has been broken down, 
replacement of an old part should further improve system reliability.  While 
the intentions appear sound, the effects on churn and excess are equally 
tangible.  If contingent material is installed at every opportunity, this will 
                                                 
2 Obtained during SHAPEC representative interview. 
3 Obtained during interview with the Chief Engineer PHNSY. 
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cause the historical use to incorrectly approach 100%.  Material will be 
installed, regardless of the current state, which will cause a re-order in the 
subsequent cycle, and so on.  This will further preclude the process from 
identifying which contingent material is actually required to combat failure.  
Escalated material costs and inaccurate demand history could follow. 
 
We believe there are four scenarios for material procurement.  Each scenario is 
based upon two criteria: whether the material was needed and whether the material was 
ordered.  Two of the four scenarios provide optimal results for the shipyard.  These are 
represented by material that is purchased and required as well as material not purchased 
that is not required.  Material that is purchased but not required generates excess, and 
required material that is not purchased but later needed and ordered will generate churn.   
The cost of each scenario differs significantly and greatly affects the ultimate 
course of action.  A brief cost analysis is presented here for each scenario.  If required 
material is purchased, the resulting cost is limited to the purchase price.  For the purpose 
of this analysis, $100 will be used to illustrate purchase price.  Consequently, if material 
is purchased and not required, the total cost would be $100 + inventory holding cost.  If 
material that is not required is not ordered, the cost is zero.  The highest costs are realized 
when required material is not ordered.  In this instance, the total cost would be $100 + the 
cost of expediting + the cost of work delays.  The latter two costs can be difficult to 
estimate; however, the shipyard has indicated that such costs are extremely high. Since 
churn has the highest potential opportunity cost, avoidance of this last scenario is critical 
in the forecasting process.   
Having analyzed the various scenarios, the final step in the forecasting process is the 
development of guidelines for decisions.  There is no one formula or process that is 
absolute in determining whether or not to procure an item.  However, three criteria are 
most significant. 
1. Cost of the item, which determines the potential cost of en excess. 
2. Probability that the item is required (based on historical demand). 
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3. Criticality of the item (determined by two criteria: (1) whether the item is in 
the critical path of a repair and (2) whether the item keeps a vessel from 
getting underway). 
An exact decision rule is beyond the scope of our study, but a small example 
should illustrate the intuition: A low cost item involved in a repair on the critical path for 
the availability is a good candidate for ordering, especially if it is low cost. A high cost 
item, not in a critical path repair, should only be ordered if there is a high probability it 
will be needed. The challenge is to define appropriate values for “high” and “low”. 
 
E.  CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
 
 Configuration management is critical to the supply chain management of any 
equipment in the military.  Maintaining an aggressive configuration management 
program will help to ensure supply personnel stock the correct parts in a budgetary 
system filled with financial constraints.  Inaccurate or untimely configuration 
management causes incorrect material to be ordered (“received the right part for the 
wrong system”).  Subsequently, the correct item must be ordered after A-0 to ensure that 
a churn item does not contribute to excess. 
Configuration changes are usually ordered by NAVSEA and implemented via the 
TYCOM (Type Commander).  Since configuration changes require funds for 
implementation, they are usually done by the ship when funds are made available to the 
ship. A configuration change or alteration may be done as a Ship Alteration (SHIPALT) 
or some other type of alteration such as an Ordnance Alteration (ORDALT).  Any 
alteration may have a direct effect on equipment data or parts data that will require 
changes to the ship’s COSAL (Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List).  It is incumbent 
upon the ship’s Supply Officer to ensure all paperwork is filed in support of any 
configuration change done aboard the ship.  
Possible results of failure to properly document configuration changes are 
significant.  Funding shortfalls create a myriad of problems throughout the military. Two 
688 class submarines may look the same from the outside and may even be numbered 
consecutively (SSN 760 & SSN 761) but may be very different on the inside. If both 
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boats are in the same squadron, there may be sufficient funds available to install new 
equipment (configuration changes) on one boat.  If the ship fails to submit the proper 
forms (i.e. 4790 CK), then NAVSEA may not know the new equipment (or update) has 
been installed. Since SHAPEC acquires its ships data from NAVSEA, a failed 
configuration change notification may result in SHAPEC listing the wrong requirements 
on a TGI (Task Group Instruction)4 for an upcoming availability. Figure 3 depicts the 
normal process of a configuration change.  The critical path in figure 3 is the path 
connecting the 4790CK from the ship to NAVSEA 
 
Figure 3: Normal Configuration Management Process 
 
In an interview conducted with COMSUBPAC (CSP) staff (October 9, 2003), we 
determined that configuration management is being done aggressively and that 
turnaround time (the time it takes for a 4790CK submitted until the results show up on an 
                                                 






















ASI and are input into the ship’s COSAL) averages approximately two weeks. 
Additionally, follow-up procedures and CSP interaction support a COSAL accuracy level 
of greater than 98%.5 Therefore, all results suggest that configuration management in the 
Submarine Force (Pacific) is not a major contributor to churn at the Pearl Harbor Naval 
Shipyard. 
 
F.  ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The absence of material control procedures (post issue custody and stowage) 
dramatically increases the potential for material misplacement and loss.  This induces 
both churn and excess (churn for reorders when material cannot be found and excess in 
the case where material that was reordered is subsequently located).   The following 
assumptions were made in order to sufficiently analyze the data provided by PHNSY.6 
The data used for this analysis was collected from the USS Santa Fe and the USS Tucson. 
Both boats underwent a Depot Scheduled Restricted Availability (DSRA).  In the 
following text the word document represents a requisition and/or part.  The total number 
of documents for Tucson is 6,133 and for Santa Fe is 7,548 (see Table 1).  It should also 
be noted that it is not mandatory to submit LMI (Local Management Information) codes 
for churn requisitions until January 1, 2004. The documents for the selected boats contain 
sufficient quantity of LMI codes to allow for analysis. For the purpose of this study, only 
those documents with LMI codes attached were reviewed. See appendix A for complete 
LMI code breakdown and definitions. 
Churn is the by far the most difficult goal to control at PHNSY.7 Most would 
envision a Just-in-time supply system where the part is there exactly when the customer 
requires it for use. Since availability schedules are controlled by NAVSEA, the shipyard 
must concern itself with meeting NAVSEA timelines for an availability period.  Under 
the new mission funded budget program, the shipyard must also concern itself with 
                                                 
5 interview with COMSUBPAC (CSP) staff ( October 9, 2003), 
6 information obtained through data collection from Mr. Alan Fujita 
7obtained from interview with PHNSY Commanding Officer and Material Department Supervisor. 
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managing both time and money under even greater constraints. Churn is a variable that 
negatively affects the budgetary planning system – specifically forecasting. Churn uses 
funds not planned for during the planning phase of the pending availability.   
The number of documents submitted during the DSRA for Tucson and Santa Fe 
totaled 13,681.  Of this total, 7,395 (54%) were submitted as churn (after the official start 
date of the DSRA): 44.55% were churn without LMI codes, compared to 9.5% with LMI 
codes. Table 1 provides a complete breakdown of individual LMI codes for both boats.  
The data presented was extrapolated from only partial LMI codes. However, the data still 
provides good insight to the analytical capabilities of LMI codes with respect to reducing 
churn. 
Approximately 1.6% of all churn generated (both boats) was due to lost material 
or mistake on TGI/ordered wrong material. This number could be much higher if LMI 
codes were submitted with each churn document.  If we extrapolate based on the limited 
LMI data presented, we can estimate that LMI codes “L” and “M” could have accounted 
for up to 702 items as lost or wrong material ordered.  There is no system in place to 
provide financial information to the Planning Officer or Material Officer concerning the 
dollar amount lost. 
LMI codes “G” and “M” seemed to present problems for future analysis.  
Specifically for code “G”, there is no clear way to differentiate between growth work and 
rework.  Because the two causes are very different, we recommend that the LMI codes be 
further broken down to provide more accurate information. While growth work may be 
an acceptable reason for increased churn, rework should probably be treated as a red flag 
and scrutinized by the appropriate manager or supervisor. LMI code “M” does not 
specify whether the problem is due to a mistake on a TGI or if the wrong material was 
ordered.  LMI code R provides no value for future analysis. As referenced in the section 
on requisition maintenance, an unacceptable RDD can be identified prior to the A-0 date.  
Items ordered after A-0 date should be researched by the ordering activity to ensure 
requested RDD could be met.  LMI code D requires further breaks down to indicate if the 
material was damaged in shipment or during the movement of material after receipt by 










  Tucson Santa Fe Docs 
Total Documents Submitted 6,133 7,548 13,681 
Churn Start Date (A-0) start of the availability 
19-Feb-
03 09-Apr-03   
Total Churn Documents Submitted 3,143 4,252 7,395 
Percentage of Documents Submitted as Churn 51.25% 56.33%   
LMI Code LMI Code Defined       
9 Invalid Code 1 0 1 
7 Invalid Code 2 0 2 
A Additional material required 677 42 719 
D Damaged/unusable material 3 2 5 
E Empty consumable bin 5 0 5 
G Growth work/rework 33 138 171 
L Lost material 21 13 34 
M Mistake on TGI, ordered wrong material 24 62 86 
N New work 205 42 247 
Q QA rejected 1 1 2 
R RDD unacceptable 3 0 3 
T Originally omitted from TGI 6 2 8 
W Wrong material received 7 5 12 
X Expired shelf life 5 0 5 
Total Churn Documents Submitted with LMI Codes 993 307 1300 
Table 1:  Sample of Santa Fe and Tucson LMIC Churn Data 
 
G.  INCENTIVES 
 
No quantitative analysis of incentives and their relation to the research question 
was performed.  It is mentioned here only as an observation.  Employees ranged from a 
few military members, to contractors, to GS (Government Service) employees.  Job 
descriptions are precise; however, a criterion governing the measurement of job 
requirements was not.  Multiple field interviews indicated that the organization did not 
possess distinct incentives relative to job performance.  As an example, in the instance 
where material has been lost or misplaced, items may be re-ordered without further 
investigative action.  Such re-orders could generate churn or excess material.  Although 
no formal analysis was conducted to quantify the extent to which an incentive program 




 As a result of the analysis, the following conclusions regarding the causes of 
churn and excess material are delineated: 
 
a. Supply system lead-time is not a contributing factor in the generation of 
churn and excess material. 
b. Consistent maintenance of outstanding requisitions can allow for timelier 
expediting and alternate requisition options.  This would increase the lead-
time available to process material requirements. 
c. The absence of quantitative forecasting models is diminishing the 
effectiveness of material forecasts. 
d. Configuration management is not a contributing factor in the generation of 
churn and excess material. 
e. Lack of material control procedures are directly related to increased levels 
of churn and excess material.  Furthermore, the limited scope and use of 
LMI codes is not providing adequate information to combat churn and 
excess. 
f. Establishment of an incentive program could reasonably be expected to 
encourage stricter material scrutiny, thus reducing churn and excess. 
 
There are limitations to the application of these conclusions.  There are two ideologies 
observed within the shipyard’s management of material: maximum readiness and 
minimal inventory.  Both practices have received significant academic endorsement.  No 
position is taken here regarding which practice is more prudent.  What is significant is 
that both positions are mutually exclusive, hence the following caveat: there is a point at 
which either churn or excess can only be reduced at the cost of increasing the other.  It 
was also noted by PHNSY that the single most important requirement during an 
availability is adherence to the schedule and that every other goal, without exception, is 
subordinate to attainment of the scheduled completion date.  Our team took no exception 
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to this priority.  However, we note only that certain levels of churn and excess material 





 The following recommended courses of action are prescribed regarding the 
conclusions in chapter III: 
 
a) Lead Time Avoid dual sourcing of requisitions regardless of the circumstances.  
Ensure identification and ordering of all known requirements approximately one 
month (34 days) prior to the commencement of work. Consistent maintenance of 
outstanding requisitions can allow for more timely expediting and alternate 
requisition options and increase the lead-time available for processing material 
requirements. 
b) Requisition Maintenance   (1) Cancel the requirement and seek an alternate source 
if and only if it can meet the required delivery date. This must be done in a timely 
manner.  Dual sourcing to “hedge” requirements is not recommended and will 
potentially yield churn and or excess material. (2) If the stock system is the sole 
source of the requirement, expedite to the degree possible, but take no further 
action.  Although not desirable since the required delivery date may not be met, 
there is no other recourse.  Either way, neither churn nor excess material will be 
generated. 
c) Forecasting Develop and implement a formal methodology for determining what 
items to order for an availability. Such a methodology account for the cost of the 
item, the likelihood it will be needed in the repair, and the importance of the 
repair to the availability.  
d) Configuration Management Monitor LMI codes to ensure significant amounts of 
churn and/or excess are not generated due to configuration discrepancies.  If such 
discrepancies occur, immediately reconcile class discrepancies with Type 
Commander and NAVSEA. 
e) Accountability Develop and enforce material control policies.  This should 
include procedures for transfer and custody of material until final disposition as 
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well as investigative requirements for losses above a prescribed threshold or when 
irregular circumstances are present. 
f) Incentives Establish an incentive program, to include both positive and negative 
controls, to optimize material management. Job descriptions are precise; however, 
a criterion governing the measurement of job requirements was not. Field 
interviews indicated that the organization did not possess distinct incentives 
relative to job performance.  As an example, in the instance where material has 
been lost or misplaced, items may be re-ordered without further investigative 
action. Incentives for employees to be held accountable for what happens to the 
issued material can help reduce lost or misplaced items. Recognition for reducing 
these type items can ensure the employees are performing and becoming part of 
the solution. Recognition is the positive side of incentives, but negative incentives 
have to be in place as well. Holding the employees accountable for those lost and 
misplaced items, by adverse performance reports, lost of time off and the cost 
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APPENDIX A - LOCAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
CODES (LMIC) 
 
Effective January 2004, use of LMI codes are mandatory after A-0 on requisitions Job 
Material Listing (JML) or Material Ordering Requests (MOR). Source: Enclosure 1 of 
TB02-22.8 
 
Authorized Codes Defined. 
 
Code Description  
G Growth work, or open and inspect work, rework 
N New work 
A Additional Appendix M material required for the job. Amount is insufficient as 
ordered for the job by the original TGI. 
T Originally omitted from TGI – should have been ordered 
M Mistake on the TGI – ordered wrong material 
R RDD – Delivery date unacceptable 
S Substitution of TGI material for convenience 
D  Damaged material; unusable – whether damaged in transit, damaged by 
Shipyard/FISC or damaged by mechanic 
E Empty consumable bin/van item 
L Lost material 
Q QA inspection rejects 
W Wrong material received from supply 
X Expired shelf life 
                                                 
8 688 SHAPEC Non-Nuclear Non-Test TGI (Task Group Instruction Development Guidelines), dated 
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APPENDIX B - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, 
SYMBOLS 
 
ASI Automated Shore Interface 
COSAL  Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List 
COMSUBPAC (CSP) Commander Submarine Pacific 
DSRA Depot Scheduled Restricted Availability 
EDD Estimated Date of Delivery 
ERO Engineering Repair Overhaul 
FISC Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 
FY Fiscal Year 
GS Government Service 
IMF Intermediate Maintenance Facility 
JML   Job Material List 
LMIC Local Management Information Codes 
MOR Material Ordering Request 
NAVSEA   Naval Sea Systems Command 
OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
ORDALT Ordnance Alteration 
PHNSY Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard  
QA  Quality Assurance 
RDD  Required Delivery Date 
SHAPEC Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center 
SHIPALT  Ships Alteration 
SRA  Selected Restricted Availability 
TGI Task Group Instruction 

































688 SHAPEC Non-Nuclear Non-Test (Task Group Instruction Development Guidelines), 
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